3200 Park Center Drive, Suite 250 Costa Mesa, California 92626 Tel 714 445-1000 • Fax 714 445-1002

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SMILEY WANG-EKVALL, LLP Philip E. Strok, State Bar No. 169296 pstrok@swelawfirm.com Kyra E. Andrassy, State Bar No. 207959 kandrassy@swelawfirm.com Timothy W. Evanston, State Bar No. 319342 tevanston@swelawfirm.com 3200 Park Center Drive, Suite 250 Costa Mesa, California 92626 Telephone: 714 445-1000 6 Facsimile: 714 445-1002 7 Attorneys for Elissa D. Miller, Chapter 7 Trustee 8 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 LOS ANGELES DIVISION 11 Case No. 2:20-bk-21022-BR In re 12 GIRARDI KEESE, Chapter 7 13 Debtor. OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR 14 RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER **GRANTING CHAPTER 7 TRUSTEE'S** 15 APPLICATION TO EMPLOY THE LAW OFFICES OF RONALD RICHARDS & 16 ASSOCIATES, A.P.C. AS SPECIAL LITIGATION COUNSEL; 17 DECLARATIONS OF ELISSA D. MILLER AND RONALD RICHARDS IN SUPPORT 18 [Evidentiary Objections to Declaration 19 of Evan C. Borges Concurrently Filed] Date: 20 To be determined To be determined Time: 21 1668 Ctrm.: 255 E. Temple Street 22 Los Angeles, CA 90012 23 24 25 26 27

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│TO THE HONORABLE BARRY RUSSELL, UNITED STATE	S BANKRUPTCY JUDGE
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Elissa D. Miller, the chapter 7 trustee (the "Trustee") for the bankruptcy estate (the "Estate") of Girardi Keese (the "Debtor"), submits this Opposition to Erika Girardi's ("Erika") Motion for Reconsideration of Order Granting Chapter 7 Trustee's Application to Employ the Law Offices of Ronald Richards & Associates, A.P.C. as Special Litigation Counsel [Docket No. 437] (the "Motion"). For the reasons set forth below, the Court should deny the Motion without a hearing.

## INTRODUCTION

Erika's Motion should be denied. The Trustee previously filed the *Chapter 7* Trustee's Application to Employ the Law Offices of Ronald Richards & Associates, A.P.C. as Special Litigation Counsel [Docket No. 318] (the "Application"). Although Erika opposed the Application, the Court ultimately entered an order authorizing the Law Offices of Ronald Richards & Associates, A.P.C. (the "Richards Firm") to represent the Trustee as special litigation counsel. Upon appointment as special litigation counsel, the Richards Firm quickly moved to investigate the Estate's claims against Erika, filing a series of motions for examinations under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure ("FRBP") 2004. With these motions granted, examinations are currently pending and scheduled to take place within the coming week. The Richards Firm, on behalf of the Trustee and the Estate, also filed a complaint against Erika and several related entities for: (1) declaratory relief; (2) turnover of property of the Estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 542; (3) avoidance and recovery of fraudulent transfer; (4) conversion; (5) constructive trust; (6) account stated; (7) open book account; (8) money had and received; (9) unjust enrichment; and (10) accounting (the "Complaint")

Faced with an impending investigation and the Complaint, Erika now brings the Motion to thwart the Trustee's efforts to investigate and pursue her and undermine the Trustee's right to choose counsel. Erika's expressed willingness to cooperate with the

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Trustee is nothing more than empty words. Her actions speak far louder. Erika is well aware of the Motion's effects if granted. If the Court grants the Motion, the Trustee will be left without special litigation counsel to investigate and pursue claims against Erika, and the Trustee's investigation and pursuit of claims will effectively cease until the Trustee finds qualified counsel to replace the Richards Firm. Not only will the Estate have to incur additional expenses in seeking approval of new special litigation counsel, the investigation and pursuit of claims will be temporarily stalled and new counsel will need to spend additional time to become familiar with the facts. The delay may negatively impact the Trustee's investigation and pursuit of claims, and there is no reason for the Trustee to suffer this prejudice caused by an unnecessary delay.

More importantly, there are no legal grounds to grant the Motion. Despite her extraordinary request, Erika makes no serious attempt to abide by the standard governing motions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("FRCP" or "Rule") 59(e). Rather than follow the correct standard under Rule 59(e), Erika relies on inadmissible evidence and purported violations of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6068 and Rule 3.6 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct. No such violations have occurred. Moreover, the issue of the alleged violations has *no* bearing on whether the Motion can be granted. Erika is not free to pick and choose whichever standard she prefers. Ninth Circuit precedent binds this Court, not Erika's whim.

In sum, there is no basis to grant the Motion. The Richards Firm has fully complied with FRBP 2014. Erika has not highlighted any other proper grounds for reconsideration under Rule 59(e). In fact, Erika makes no argument at all that there is an actual conflict that precludes the Richards Firm from serving as special litigation counsel; she merely repackages prior arguments this Court previously rejected. Furthermore, Erika has no standing to even bring the Motion. The Trustee's investigation and pursuit

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As discussed in more detail later, Erika has since filed a series of oppositions interfering with the Trustee's administration of the Estate. She has also attempted to disrupt the investigation of claims by special litigation counsel in Thomas Girardi's individual case by filing a late opposition.

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of c	laims	against	Erika n	nust	continue	without	further	disruption	and	interfer	ence

Accordingly, the Court should deny the Motion without a hearing.

### II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

### Α. The Application and Hearing on the Application

On April 26, 2021, the Trustee filed the Application seeking to retain the Richards Firm as special litigation counsel pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 327(c) and (e) to investigate and pursue potential claims against Erika and any of her related entities. On May 10, 2021, Erika filed an opposition to the Application [Docket No. 333]. On June 1, 2021, the Trustee filed a reply to Erika's opposition [Docket No. 374].

On June 8, 2021, the Court held a hearing on the Application. A transcript of the hearing is attached here as Ex. "1." At the hearing, Erika requested that the Court issue a gag order against Ronald Richards ("Richards") of the Richards Firm because of certain out of court statements. However, the Court made clear that it would not issue any gag order against Richards in the following exchange:

The Court: I'm not going to issue any gag order. I don't even know if I have the power to do that at all...I'm not going to—I can't and would not stop him from exercising his First Amendment Rights. So I'll leave it at that.

Mr. Mastan: Okay. Fair enough...

See June 8, 2021 Transcript at 6:8-15, Ex. "1."

Ultimately, the Court granted the Application and stated, "I am satisfied that there is no – there is no conflict...I will approve the application..." See June 8, 2021 Transcript at 38:14-23, Ex. "1." On June 10, 2021, the Court entered an order granting the Trustee's Application based on the Richards Firm's representation that it would not pursue any claims (on behalf of its creditor clients) against Erika involving any transfers from the Debtor to Erika. See Order, Ex. "2."

### B. The Trustee's Ongoing Investigation and the Complaint

Since the Court granted the Application, the Richards Firm has started conducting its investigation of potential claims that may exist against Erika and filed several motions

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for examinations under FRBP 2004 on behalf of the Trustee. On June 18, 2021, the
Trustee filed a Motion for Order Requiring Examination and Production of Documents by
Benjamin Khakshour Pursuant to Rule 2004 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure [Docket No. 409]. On June 22, 2021, the Trustee filed a Motion for Order
Requiring Examination and Production of Documents by Harris Ginsburg LLP and Larry
A. Ginsburg Pursuant to Rule 2004 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure
[Docket No. 423]. On June 23, 2021, the Trustee filed a Motion for Order Requiring
Examination and Production of Documents by Ullman Accountancy Corp. and Michael J.
Ullman Pursuant to Rule 2004 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure [Docket No

The 2004 Motions are directed at Erika's landlord, Erika's family law counsel, and Erika's business manager. On June 28, 2021, the Court entered orders granting the 2004 Motions, ordering the parties to produce certain documents as well as appear at their respective examinations on July 22, 2021 and July 23, 2021. See Orders at Docket Nos. 440, 441, and 443.

427] (these motions collectively, the "2004 Motions").

On July 14, 2021, the Richards Firm filed the Complaint on behalf of the Trustee and the Estate.

# C. **Erika's Recent Efforts to Interfere with the Trustee's Case Administration**

The Trustee is ceaselessly working to protect the former clients of the Debtor and ensure that they have qualified counsel representing their interests. In order to protect the Debtor's clients, the Trustee has continued to file motions to transition their cases to competent counsel. Prior to the Court granting the Application, Erika did not oppose any of the Trustee's motions to transition cases.

On June 9, 2021, the Trustee filed a Motion for Order Authorizing the Transition of the Estate's Interest in the NFL Concussion Litigation to Goldberg Persky White P.C. Free and Clear of Liens, Claims and Interests Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 363 [Docket No. 389] (the "Motion to Transition NFL Concussion Litigation"). On June 23, 2021, the

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Trustee filed a Motion for Order Authorizing the Transition and Assignment of the Estate's Interests in the Mesh Litigation to Nadrich & Cohen LLP and the Oshman Firm, LLC, Free and Clear of Liens, Claims and Interests Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 363 [Docket No. 428] (the "Motion to Transition the Mesh Litigation").

After the Court granted the Application, Erika proceeded to file several oppositions to the Trustee's motions to transition cases. On June 28, 2021, Erika filed an objection to the Motion to Transition NFL Concussion Litigation. On July 7, 2021, Erika filed an objection to the Motion to Transition the Mesh Litigation [Docket No. 481].<sup>2</sup> Both motions have been set for hearing on August 10, 2021, at 2:00 p.m.

### III. LEGAL ARGUMENT

"[R]econsideration of an order in a bankruptcy case may be sought under either Rules 9023 or 9024, which incorporate Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and 60(b) respectively." Eisen v. Golden (In re Eisen), 2007 WL 7532273 at \*2 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2007).

Reconsideration is an "extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of judicial resources." Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 945 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal citation omitted). "Indeed, 'a motion for reconsideration should not be granted, absently highly unusual circumstances, unless the district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the controlling law." Id. citing Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000). "A Rule 59(e) motion may not be used to raise arguments or present evidence for the first time when they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation." Kona Enters., Inc., 229 F.3d at 890 (emphasis in original).

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On July 5, 2021, the day before the scheduled hearing, Erika filed a late Opposition to the Motion to Approve Stipulation Between Jason M. Rund (Chapter 7 Trustee) and Secured Creditors Joseph Ruigomez, Jaime Ruigomez, and Kathleen Ruigomez for Relief from the Automatic Stay Under 11 U.S.C. § 362 [Docket No. 236] in Thomas Girardi's individual case.

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A motion for reconsideration may also not be used to "rehash the same arguments made the first time or simply express an opinion that the court was wrong." *In re Greco*, 113 B.R. 658, 664 (D. Haw. 1990), aff'd and remanded sub nom., *Greco v. Troy Corp.*, 952 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1991); see also In re Mannie, 299 B.R. 603, 608 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2003) ("A motion to reconsider should not be used 'to ask the court to "rethink what the court had already thought through—rightly or wrongly"—or to reiterate arguments previously raised.") (internal citation omitted).

# Erika Has No Standing to Seek Reconsideration of the Order Granting Α. the Application

Erika lacks standing to bring the Motion. She is a litigation defendant – nothing more. "A party's standing in a bankruptcy case is governed by the 'person aggrieved' standard. A 'person aggrieved' is one whose pecuniary interests are directly adversary affected." Sheen v. Diamond (In re Am. Comput. & Dig. Components, Inc.), 2005 WL 6960172 at \*3 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. May 12, 2005); see also In re Autosport Int'l, Inc., 2013 WL 3199826 at \*3-4 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. June 24, 2013) (determining that opposition documents to motion could not be considered because the party lacked standing).

Erika has not made any showing of how she is a person aggrieved with standing. Here, Erika has not filed a proof of claim, nor has she ever claimed to be a creditor of the Estate. In short, the Motion fails to highlight any pecuniary interest of Erika's that would be adversely affected by an order granting the Application. There are none. To the extent Erika asserts that she has a community property interest in Thomas Girardi's equity interest in the Debtor, her alleged community property interest is property of the Thomas Girardi bankruptcy estate controlled by its trustee, Jason Rund, not the Debtor.

Erika cannot establish standing simply because she is a defendant in a fraudulent transfer action. Courts have routinely held that status as a defendant in a fraudulent transfer case does not confer standing. See, e.g. Abbott v. Daff (In re Abbott), 183 B.R. 198 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the debtor's wife did not have standing as a potential defendant to appeal the order reopening case so that trustee could pursue

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fraudulent transfer claims against her); Wigley v. Wigley (In re Wigley), 886 F.3d 681, 685 (8th Cir. 2018) (holding that debtor's wife did not have standing to appeal bankruptcy court's order granting the creditor relief from stay to prosecute fraudulent transfer action against her).

The Ninth Circuit's decision in *Fondiller v. Robertson (In re Fondiller)*, 707 F.2d 441 (9th Cir. 1983) mirrors the facts here. In Fondiller, the chapter 7 trustee employed special litigation counsel to investigate and pursue fraudulent transfer claims against a debtor and his wife, a non-debtor. The bankruptcy court approved the employment of special litigation counsel, and the BAP affirmed. Subsequently, the wife appealed the order, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the BAP. In its holding, the Ninth Circuit noted that the wife's only "demonstrable interest" was as a "potential party defendant in an adversary proceeding[.]" Id. at 443. Thus, because the "order did not diminish her property, increase her burdens, or detrimentally affect her rights," the wife lacked standing to appeal the order. Similarly, the order granting the Application has no direct impact on Erika. The order itself does not diminish her property, increase any burdens, or detrimentally affect any rights. Indeed, Erika raises none of these arguments in her opposition.

In sum, Erika, is a mere defendant and does not have standing to seek reconsideration of the order granting the Application. The Court should disregard the Motion on this basis alone. Nonetheless, as set forth below, Erika's Motion also fails on the merits and provides no grounds for reconsideration.

### В. There are No Grounds Under Rule 59(e) to Grant the Motion

### 1. **Erika's Motion is Premised on Incorrect Standards**

Erika ignores the clear standard for reconsideration under Rule 59(e). Under Rule 59(e), grounds for reconsideration of the Application must be solely based on: (1) newly

discovered evidence,<sup>3</sup> (2) clear error by the court; or (3) an intervening change in controlling law.<sup>4</sup> See Carroll, 342 F.3d at 945 (9th Cir. 2003). Here, the Court must consider whether the new "evidence" from Erika establishes whether there was an actual conflict under sections 327(c) and (e) that requires reconsideration of the order granting the Application.

Erika does not argue that the Court made a clear error in granting the Application, nor does Erika highlight any intervening change in controlling law. Instead, Erika devotes the majority of the Motion to arguing whether there are purported violations of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6068 and Rule 3.6 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct. These grounds are irrelevant and cannot be considered in the context of a motion for reconsideration. See White v. N.H. Dep't of Emp't Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 450 (1982) ("[F]ederal courts generally have invoked Rule 59(e) only to support reconsideration of matters properly encompassed in a decision on the merits.") (emphasis added). "Evidence" of purported violations of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6068 and Rule 3.6 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct is not evidence of an actual conflict under sections 327(c) and (e). In short, the Court is required to reconsider whether actual conflicts exist, not whether there were purported violations of rules governing attorney conduct.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Erika briefly argues that there is "newly discovered evidence" that the Richards Firm did not disclose an apparent connection in violation of FRBP 2014 with a petitioning creditor, Kimberly Archie. As discussed below, this is false.

To the extent Erika moves under Rule 60(b), Erika similarly fails to follow the correct standard. "Rule 60(b) 'provides for reconsideration only upon a showing of (1) mistake, surprise, excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) fraud; (4) a void judgment; (5) a satisfied or discharged judgment; or (6) "extraordinary circumstances" which would justify relief.'" See School Dist. No. 1J, Multonomah County v. AC & S, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993).

Although not relevant to whether the Court can reconsider the order granting the Application, the Richards Firm has not violated Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6068 or Rule 3.6 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct. See Declaration of Erin Joyce filed in support of the Richards Firm's opposition. Moreover, Erika has offered no evidence of any prejudice. Erika has not provided a declaration that any of Richards' statements were false, and Erika's counsel has never asked Richards to remove or modify any posts for inaccuracies. See Declaration of Ronald Richards. Instead, Erika relies on incomplete conversations from unverified accounts. See Declaration of Bjorn Wallman filed in support of the Richards Firm's opposition.

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Erika not only fails to argue the correct grounds for reconsideration, but also makes no explanation as to how Richards' alleged out of court comments<sup>6</sup> create an actual conflict that warrants reconsideration of the Application. The Application was granted under sections 327(c) and (e). Courts have held that "where the trustee seeks to appoint counsel only as 'special counsel' for a specific matter, there need only be no conflict between the trustee and counsel's creditor client with respect to the specific matter itself." Stoumbos v. Kilimnik (In re Am. Alloy Metals), 988 F.2d 949, 964 (9th Cir. 1993) (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added). "Section 327(e) has a narrower focus than § 327(a), and imposes fewer restrictions on the proposed attorney." See In re Polaroid Corp., 424 B.R. 446, 452 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2010). Although Section 327(c) applies generally to all employment under section § 327...clearly the 'actual conflict of interest' that it references must be analyzed in the narrower context of § 327(e)." Id. citing Stombous, 988 F.2d at 964. Nowhere in the Motion does Erika argue that there are actual conflicts of interest with respect to the Richards Firm's specialized employment. Rather, Erika simply recycles her prior arguments that Richards should not be permitted to publicly comment about her (despite being a public figure), and that Richards' public comments warrant disgualification. A "motion for consideration is not permitted...to rehash the same arguments made the first time..." See In re Greco, 113 B.R. at 664. The Court has unequivocally rejected these arguments and refused to issue a gag order. See June 8, 2021 Transcript at 6:2-14, Ex. "1." In sum, Erika has not argued that there are any actual conflicts, nor has she cited any evidence, new or otherwise, of any actual conflicts—she simply chooses to disregard binding Ninth Circuit precedent regarding Rule 59(e).

### 2. Erika Requests Relief Beyond the Scope of a Rule 59(e) Motion

Erika also requests affirmative relief concerning issues not before the Court and beyond the scope of a Rule 59(e) motion. "Rule 59(e) was added to the Federal Rules of

Erika does not provide any admissible evidence regarding Richards' alleged comments. See the Trustee's Evidentiary Objections concurrently filed.

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Erika's request that the Court "find that Mr. Richards is unfit and should be disqualified from serving as counsel to a federal bankruptcy trustee" is improper. See Motion at 16:9-11. A motion to reconsider is brought only to correct a prior order based on a reconsideration of the merits. See White, 455 U.S. at 450. A request for a finding that counsel is unfit to represent a trustee is an affirmative request that cannot be brought in a motion for reconsideration because it is not correcting anything in the prior order. At the hearing on the Application, the Court properly considered whether there were any actual conflicts of interest with respect to the Richards' Firms employment. Again, this is the only issue before the Court right now. Richards' fitness as special litigation counsel was never at issue in the Application. It is not at issue now. Erika's request is inappropriate and a plain attempt to subvert the Trustee's right to her choice of counsel—it should not be considered by the Court.

# 3. The Richards Firm Fully Complied with FRBP 2014

Erika's contention that the Richards Firm failed to comply with FRBP 2014 is wrong and without support. Under FRBP 2014, an application to employ counsel "shall be accompanied by a verified statement of the person to be employed setting forth the person's connections with the debtor, creditors, or any other party in interest..." FRBP 2014(a). As described by a leading treatise:

The term "connection" is an unfortunate one. Arguably two people are "connected" if they serve together on a charitable board or are even friends...The "connections" cited by the courts run to fee sharing arrangements and the like that might affect the court's decision to approve the employment.

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ed.).

The Richards Firm has fully complied with FRBP 2014(a). When the Application was filed, the Richards Firm fully disclosed its representation of other creditors. Moreover, the Richards Firm has repeatedly agreed that it would not pursue certain claims of these creditors that belong to the Estate. The Court has recognized these

See 9 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 2014.05 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th

agreements from Richards at two separate hearings, and in two separate orders. See

Orders at Exs. "2," and "3."

Erika's newfound "evidence" of the "connection" between the Richards Firm and Ms. Archie, a petitioning creditor, does not warrant denial of the Application. Because no "connection" exists between the Richards Firm and Ms. Archie, there was no violation of FRBP 2014(a). Erika's assertion is problematic for three reasons. First, Erika provides no evidence that at the time of the Application, Richards even knew that Ms. Archie was being interviewed in the same documentary. Indeed, Richards did not know that Ms. Archie was participating in the documentary until after it aired. The Richards Firm could not have disclosed a fact that it had no knowledge of. See Declaration of Ronald Richards at ¶ 6. Second, there is no connection between the Richards Firm and Ms. Archie. The Richards Firm has never had any legal, business, or personal relationship with Ms. Archie or any other petitioning creditors. *Id.* Third, Erika's definition of "connection" is overly broad and unworkable in practice. According to Erika, the Richards Firm is "connected" to Ms. Archie because both allegedly participated in the same documentary. If Erika's understanding of "connection" were true, a party could seek disqualification of counsel any time opposing counsel provided statements to be published in the same article. In this situation, a party could seek disqualification of counsel in nearly every high profile bankruptcy case where interviews take place. Erika's theory does not make sense. This is made clear by the fact that Erika fails to explain how this "connection" poses any threat to the Estate or how the Richards Firm's duty to represent the Estate is compromised. Mere coincidence is not a connection, and is

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The Court should not grant the Motion.

certainly no reason to allow Erika to infringe on the Trustee's right to choice of counsel.

# C. The Motion Will Disrupt the Trustee's Ongoing Investigation and Pursuit of Claims

Erika is attempting to disrupt the Trustee's ongoing investigation and pursuit of claims through the Motion. The Trustee's special litigation counsel, the Richards Firm, has been actively investigating and pursuing the Estate's claims against Erika, as evidenced by the pending 2004 examinations and the Complaint. If the Motion is granted, the Trustee will be left to look for new counsel in the middle of her investigation and pursuit of claims. The Trustee will then have to incur the additional expense of seeking approval of new counsel's employment, and spend additional time waiting for her choice to be approved. Once appointed, new counsel will then need more time to become familiar with the issues and facts at hand. This delay may prejudice the Trustee's investigation. See Declaration of Elissa D. Miller.

Erika's attempt to undermine any pending investigation and the pursuit of claims against her is clear. She recently opposed the motion to approve a stipulation for relief from stay so special litigation counsel for the trustee in Thomas Girardi's individual case could proceed against her. Moreover, Erika has demonstrated that she is willing to now impede the Trustee's efforts to protect victims of the Debtor by opposing the Trustee's recent motions to transition cases. Prior to the granting of the Application, Erika did not oppose any of the Trustee's similar motions. Now, Erika appears willing to stop at nothing to obstruct the investigation and pursuit of claims and prejudice the Estate. The Trustee should not be prejudiced by Erika's blatant efforts to interfere with the Trustee's efforts and protection of the Debtor's clients.

25 26

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IV.	COI	NCL	USI	ON

For the foregoing reasons, the Trustee requests that the Court enter an order denying the Application without a hearing.

By:

PHILIP E. STROK

Trustee

Attorneys for Elissa D. Miller, Chapter 7

DATED: July 16, 2021 SMILEY WANG-EKVALL, LLP

Costa Mesa, California 92626 Tel 714 445-1000 • Fax 714 445-1002 

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# **DECLARATION OF ELISSA D. MILLER**

I, Elissa D. Miller, declare as follows:

- 1. I am the duly appointed chapter 7 trustee for the bankruptcy estate of Girardi Keese. I am also a partner at the law firm Sulmeyer Kupetz, a Professional Corporation. I know each of the following facts to be true of my own personal knowledge, except as otherwise stated and, if called as a witness, I could and would competently testify with respect thereto. I make this declaration in support of the *Opposition to Motion* for Reconsideration of Order Granting Chapter 7 Trustee's Application to Employ the Law Offices of Ronald Richards & Associates, A.P.C. as Special Litigation Counsel (the "Opposition"). Unless otherwise defined in this declaration, all terms defined in the Opposition are incorporated herein by this reference.
- 2. I am currently investigating and pursuing claims against Ms. Erika Girardi. On July 14, 2021, the Richards Firm, my special litigation counsel, filed the Complaint against Erika.
- 3. I will need to begin looking for new special litigation counsel if the Court grants Erika's Motion. The search for new special litigation counsel will be in the midst of my investigation and litigation of the Complaint against Erika, and will require the Estate to incur additional expenses to seek approval of my potential new special litigation counsel.
- 4. In addition to the extra expenses the Estate would incur if the Motion is granted, I will also have to wait additional time for approval of my new special litigation counsel. After approval, new special litigation counsel will need to spend additional time to familiarize itself with the issues and facts at hand. I believe that the increased delay may result in prejudice to my investigation.
- 5. The current special litigation counsel is my choice of counsel. It would be prejudicial for me to waste valuable time looking for new counsel.

6.	Mr. Richards has worked tirelessly and with the tenacity I expected when
retained him.	The Estate is well-served by his representation to investigate this target,
Erika Girardi.	

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on this 16th day of July, 2021, at Los Angeles, California.

Elissa D. Miller

# **DECLARATION OF RONALD RICHARDS**

I, Ronald Richards, declare as follows:

- 1. I am an attorney with the Richards Firm, special litigation counsel to Elissa D. Miller, the chapter 7 trustee for the bankruptcy estate of Girardi Keese. I know each of the following facts to be true of my own personal knowledge, except as otherwise stated and, if called as a witness, I could and would competently testify with respect thereto. I make this declaration in support of the *Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration of Order Granting Chapter 7 Trustee's Application to Employ the Law Offices of Ronald Richards & Associates, A.P.C.* (the "Opposition"). Unless otherwise defined in this declaration, all terms defined in the Opposition are incorporated herein by this reference.
- 2. On April 26, 2021, the Trustee filed the Application to employ the Richards Firm as special litigation counsel.
- 3. On June 8, 2021, the Court held a hearing on the Application. I attended and participated in oral argument at the hearing on the Application. A true and correct copy of the transcript I ordered of the June 8, 2021 hearing on the Application is attached hereto as Exhibit "1."
- 4. At the hearing on the Application, I stated that the Richards Firm would not pursue claims to recover transfers from the Debtor to Erika on behalf of the Richards Firm's creditor clients. I previously made the same representation to the Court at an earlier hearing on a motion for remand, as recognized in this Court's order granting the motion for remand. A true and correct copy of the order granting the motion for remand is attached hereto as Exhibit "3."
- 5. On June 10, 2021, the Court entered an order granting the Application. A true and correct copy of the order granting the Application is attached hereto as Exhibit "2."
- 6. The Richards Firm has never had any legal, business, or personal relationship with Ms. Kimberly Archie or any of the other petitioning creditors. Further, I did not know that Ms. Archie had participated in the documentary produced by ABC until

2875336.4 17 OPPOSITION

after the documentary aired because I saw her on television.	I have no legal	connection
to Ms. Archie whatsoever.		

- 7. I have never received a request from counsel for Erika to remove or modify any of my online posts about Erika for inaccuracies.
- 8. No one from Erika Girardi's management has ever complained about anything that could be attributable to my office as being inaccurate or untrue.
- 9. I have never met or spoken with Erika Girardi and have no personal agenda whatsoever related to her. I am only taking direction from my client, the Trustee.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on this 16th day of July, 2021.

Ronald Richards

Ronald Richards

Case 2:20-bk-21022-BR Doc 496 Filed 07/16/21 Entered 07/16/21 13:40:33 Desc Main Document Page 22 of 78

EXHIBIT "1"

```
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
 1
 2
            CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA - LOS ANGELES
 3
                               --000--
 4
    In Re:
                                  ) Case No. 2:20-bk-21022-BR
 5
    GIRARDI KEESE,
                                  ) Chapter 7
 6
                   Debtor.
                                  ) Los Angeles, California
                                  ) Tuesday, 10:00 A.M.
 7
                  ----X June 8, 2021
 8
                                  HEARING RE: CHAPTER 7
 9
                                  TRUSTEE'S APPLICATION TO
                                  EMPLOY THE LAW OFFICES OF
10
                                  RONALD RICHARDS & ASSOCIATES,
                                  A.P.C., AS SPECIAL LITIGATION
11
                                  COUNSEL
12
                     TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
13
                 BEFORE THE HONORABLE BARRY RUSSELL
                   UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE
14
15
   APPEARANCES:
   For the Trustee:
16
                            LEI LEI WANG EKVALL, ESQ.
                             Smiley Wang-Ekvall, LLP
17
                             3200 Park Center Drive
                             Suite #250
                             Costa Mesa, California 92626
18
19
   For Erika Keese:
                            PETER J. MASTAN, ESQ.
                             Dinsmore & Shohl, LLP
20
                             550 South Hope Street
                             Suite #1765
21
                             Los Angeles, California 90071
22
   Special Litigation
                            RONALD RICHARDS, ESQ.
    Counsel:
                             PO Box 11480
23
                             Beverly Hills, California 90213
24
   Proceedings produced by electronic sound recording;
25
    transcript produced by transcription service.
```

**P** 888.272.0022 **F** 818.343.7119



1 Court Recorder: Wanda Toliver U.S. Bankruptcy Court 2 Central District of California Edward R. Roybal Federal Building 3 and Courthouse 255 East Temple Street, Room #1639 Los Angeles, California 90012 4 (855) 460-9641 5 Ruth Ann Hager, C.E.T.\*\*D-641 Court Transcriptionist: 6 Ben Hyatt Certified Deposition Reporters 7 17835 Ventura Boulevard Suite #310 8 Encino, California 91316 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

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Certified Deposition Reporters

	Page 3
1	LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA, TUESDAY, JUNE 8, 2021
2	10:02 A.M.
3	000
4	THE CLERK: #5.00, Girardi Keese.
5	THE COURT: All right. Make your appear you
6	can stay make your appearance where you're at and
7	THE CLERK: You have to say that
8	THE COURT: Oh, I'm sorry. I thank you. She
9	keeps me out of trouble.
10	MS. WANG EKVALL: We're all a bit rusty, Your
11	Honor. Good morning, Your Honor. Lei Lei Wang Ekvall with
12	Smiley Wang Ekvall, counsel for Elissa Miller, Chapter 7
13	Trustee.
14	THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. And the only time
15	I'd like you to take your mask down is when you speak, but
16	other than that, use whatever your discretion. We want to
17	keep everybody as safe as we can.
18	MR. RICHARDS: Good to see you, Your Honor. You
19	look great. Ronald Richards with Law Offices of Ronald
20	Richards & Associates, APC, also appearing on #5.00.
21	THE COURT: All right.
22	MR. MASTAN: Good morning, Your Honor. Peter
23	Mastan of Dinsmore & Shohl, LLP, appearing on behalf of
24	Erika Girardi.
25	THE COURT: Okay. This is the I've read your

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Page 4 papers with quite -- with interest. This is the Trustee's

2 application to employ your firm. It's your -- who wants

to -- I guess you want to -- who wants to -- it's either --3

4 it would be, I guess whichever one the two of you want to

5 talk. Again, I've read all the papers and you'll get the

6 second-to-the-last word.

MS. WANG EKVALL: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: You're welcome.

MS. WANG EKVALL: We'll just summarize our position then, Your Honor. We believe that Ms. Jane (phonetic) or Mrs. Girardi does not have standing to oppose the employment.

THE COURT: Well, let me do this. I have some question about it, but I'm going to assume for our purposes that standing is always a tricky question at best, so I'm just going to assume for our purposes the standing rather than take the time. She may or may not but I'm assuming at this point, so why don't you go to the merits of it?

MS. WANG EKVALL: Moreover, Your Honor, Mr. Richard's firm is being employed for a very specific purpose, a very narrow purpose. He is being employed as special counsel. And under 363 -- sorry -- 327 --

THE COURT: Close enough. I understand this is --

> MS. WANG EKVALL: Sorry.

Page 5

1 | THE COURT: It's all right.

MS. WANG EKVALL: 327(c) and (e), Your Honor. The fact that Mr. Richards represents a creditor in the case does not exclude him or prevent him for being employable by the Trustee. And in this case there is no actual conflict that would prohibit him from being employed for the limited purpose as stated in the employment application of investigating and pursuing claims against Ms. Jane. With respect to claims review in general or claim objections in general, that will be handled by my office as the Trustee's general bankruptcy counsel.

THE COURT: All right. Counsel.

MR. MASTAN: Good morning again, Your Honor. But there are conflicts here and there are two of them that are actual conflicts of interest.

I do want to start by making sure that everyone is aware that Ms. Girardi is not here to impede the Trustee's investigation. We understand that has to happen. Mr. Rund in the other case is doing the same thing. We didn't oppose his retention as special counsel to look into --

THE COURT: All right.

MR. MASTAN: -- the investigation. We're only saying that the investigation can't be done by Mr. Richards or his firm because of his conflicts of interests. And

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Page
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   again, there are two of them. And what --
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 2
              THE COURT: It's also clear you're not happy with
   him. I mean, he's a little more vocal than I am, but
3
 4
   that -- you know, you're complaining about all that. It's
5
   not my style, but -- but I -- it's clear it's gotten under
   your client's skin and so that may -- I don't know if
6
   that's part of it, but my -- but as far as that position
   is -- you know, I'm not going to issue any gag order. I
8
   don't even know if I have the power to do that at all. And
9
10
   if you have any serious complaint there are other people,
11
   entities you can go to complain to conduct, but I --
   myself, I'm not going to -- I can't and would not stop him
12
13
   from exercising his First Amendment rights. So I'll leave
14
   it at that.
             MR. MASTAN: Okay. Fair enough. And that --
15
16
             THE COURT: It was interesting reading, however.
17
   I was -- a lot of stuff there --
             MR. MASTAN: And again --
18
19
             THE COURT: -- to look through.
20
             MR. MASTAN: That is --
             THE COURT: It's not my -- my style --
21
22
             MR. MASTAN: Right.
23
             THE COURT: -- doesn't make it right or wrong.
24
    It just -- I just don't -- I think he has his right to
25
   express his views and what have you and it's clear he is
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7 Page not thrilled with your client. I mean, so --1 2 MR. MASTAN: Fair enough. THE COURT: -- that's a fact. 3 MR. MASTAN: And that was an if-he's-employed 4 5 kind of thing, but it doesn't go to the thrust of the 6 substance of the real argument. 7 THE COURT: Oh, no, I understand that. I 8 understand, but I just get that out in front. It was clear 9 that there was a huge amount of stuff. I didn't read every 10 page of everything, but I got the flavor. 11 MR. MASTAN: So we've taken sort of standing and 12 the gag order. 13 THE COURT: Yes. 14 MR. MASTAN: So get to the main -- the main show 15 here. 16 THE COURT: The main thing is your objection 17 because of con -- of alleged conflicts. 18 MR. MASTAN: Yes, let's talk about the conflicts 19 and there are two. First, Mr. Richards is representing 20 creditors the Sheldon and Finn law firms in connection with litigation pending in state court against Ms. Girardi. 21 22 THE COURT: Right. 23 MR. MASTAN: When we filed this we believed that 24 there were two causes of action that were bring -- being 25 brought against Ms. Girardi. Ms. Wang Ekvall brought to my Page 8

attention afterwards which I was not aware of that the fraudulent transfer claims have been taken care of.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. MASTAN: And I appreciate and thank Ms. Wang Ekvall for doing that. But nothing, as far as I know, has changed the conversion claims. And Mr. Richards on behalf of the Finn/Sheldon law firms is alleging that money went to Girardi Keese and was converted -- their money was converted to -- by Ms. Girardi and others.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. MASTAN: So at the same time that he is bringing and prosecuting those claims, he is also being retained by the Trustee to look into avoidable transfers from the Girardi & Keese law firm to Ms. Girardi.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. MASTAN: That's where the money flowed. So at that moment you have an irreconcilable conflict of interest because he cannot both at the same time seek the recovery of those funds on behalf of the Finn/Sheldon law firms and seek it on behalf of the Trustee.

What's very important to understand here in addition to that is that there is a pie of assets out there. To the extent that -- and I'll tell you, it ain't big enough to cover anything here that we're talking about.

THE COURT: Well, hope springs eternal, but I



Page 9 1 guess we don't know for sure. 2 MR. MASTAN: Well, yeah. Yeah. THE COURT: I guess the big thing is, is this 3 4 big -- you know, the Porter Ranch case, but who knows. 5 MR. MASTAN: But who knows. But what I'm saying 6 is her assets. 7 THE COURT: Oh, you're talking about -- oh, I'm 8 sorry. You're talking --9 MR. MASTAN: Hers, yeah. 10 THE COURT: -- about hers. 11 MR. MASTAN: Hers, yes. THE COURT: Not -- okay, I got it. 12 MR. MASTAN: There's a limited pie out here. 13 14 to the extent that -- let's assume they're both correct. 15 Let's assume they're both entitled to judgments. If 16 Mr. Richards geta to judgment first and collects on behalf 17 of the Shinn -- the Finn/Sheldon law firms, that dilutes and takes away completely, I believe, any possible recovery 18 19 from Ms. Girardi for the estate leaving the estate's creditors in the cold. 20 21 Now, if Mr. Richards on behalf of the estate gets 22 there and recovers first, then that means -- that's fine 23 for the estate, but then he's now done a disservice to his 24 other creditors who would have 100 percent dollar for 25 dollar on that as opposed to a pro rata distri -- sharing

Page 10

with the other creditors. Who gets there first? Who makes that decision? You can't have one person, Mr. Richards in his case or his law firm, following the instructions of two masters about one piece -- one pie of assets that's not enough to go around.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. MASTAN: And over the same funds. It doesn't work.

The second conflict of interest relates to the proofs of claim. Mr. Richards has asserted, the Finn/Sheldon law firm has asserted that they have claims to recover against the estate for these -- for what is admittedly an oral agreement for referral fees. California makes those types of agreements unenforceable on their face and I don't think there's any dispute that they were oral agreements. I think that was in their complaint. So there was a patently obvious and necessary opposition and objection by this Trustee to those claims.

Now, what do we --

THE COURT: What does that have to do with what we're talking about in this case against going after Mrs. Girardi?

MR. MASTAN: Well, it has to do with it in two ways. One, whose money is it? Whose money is it? Is this the Finn law firm's claim, Finn/Sheldon law firm's money

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Page
                                                             11
   that went through or is it the Girardi Keese law firm's
 1
 2
   money that went out? Who's going to make that decision?
   Mr. Richards, as the representative of both, can't.
 3
 4
              So if he's representing the -- how do I explain
 5
    this?
 6
              THE COURT: Take a deep breath. I know it --
 7
              MR. MASTAN: Yeah, there's no water --
 8
              THE COURT: -- gets complicated.
 9
              MR. MASTAN: There's no water. I apologize, Your
10
   Honor.
11
              THE COURT: Oh, yeah, I guess normally we would
12
   but, yeah --
13
              MR. MASTAN: Right.
14
              THE COURT: -- just given everything else, we
15
   don't have any.
16
              MR. MASTAN: Right. So while the G case suggests
17
    that -- well --
              THE COURT: I may inform people in the future
18
19
   because I'm now --
20
              MR. MASTAN: Should bring a bottle of water.
21
              THE COURT: I'm sorry to actually if you want,
22
   yeah, to bring it --
23
              MR. MASTAN: Yeah.
24
              THE COURT: -- I never even thought about it, but
25
    that's --
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Page
                                                            12
             MR. MASTAN: Yeah.
1
 2
              THE COURT: -- a good idea.
3
             MR. MASTAN: So if there is a claim objection,
4
   there has to be one because it's patently --
5
             UNIDENTIFIED VOICE: Yeah, I'm listening to
6
   Peter --
7
             MR. MASTAN: -- objectionable by itself.
8
             UNIDENTIFIED VOICE: -- in the middle of oral
9
   argument.
10
             THE COURT: Excuse me. Stacy, what was that? I
   heard a voice there.
11
12
             THE CLERK: I got it. I muted him.
13
             THE COURT: Okay.
14
             MR. MASTAN: Okay.
             THE COURT: All right. I don't know who that --
15
16
   or what -- go on.
17
             MR. MASTAN: So the Trustee at that point is
18
   going to be litigating against the same clients as Mr.
19
   Richards -- Mister -- as her special counsel.
20
             Now, there was a case cited for -- in the
21
   Fondiller (phonetic) case, I believe -- pull that out -- to
22
   suggest that that's not a problem. But in that case the
23
   court approved the retention of counsel for creditors, but
24
   it made a point to say those creditors aren't involved in
25
   the transactions that are taking place.
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Page
                                                            13
             That's not the case what we have here. Here
1
2
   Mr. Richards' clients are the ones who are asserting that
3
   the money is theirs, that the money was recoverable from
 4
   Ms. Girardi and at the same time that they're all asserting
5
   the claims against the estate, same money.
6
             THE COURT: Well, tell me again about this oral
7
   contract. I mean, what is that claiming and how is that
8
   different from the first one we're talking about?
9
             MR. MASTAN: It is different in that it is -- it
10
   creates a --
11
             THE COURT: No, but who are they -- that was
12
   between --
13
             MR. MASTAN: That was between the Finn/Sheldon --
14
             THE COURT: Yes.
15
             MR. MASTAN: -- purposed creditors.
             THE COURT: Yes. And?
16
17
             MR. MASTAN: And the estate because Ms. Miller
   will have an obligation --
18
19
             THE COURT: No, no, no. Who is the other side of
20
   the -- I think I understand. Just for the record --
21
             MR. MASTAN: Ms. Miller.
22
             THE COURT: Who is the other side of this oral
23
   agreement.
24
             MR. MASTAN: Oh, it was Girardi & Keese.
25
             THE COURT: Okay. And -- okay.
```

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Page
                                                             14
              MR. MASTAN: Or Tom Girardi, however.
1
 2
              THE COURT: And so that -- okay. Oh, oh, here we
3
   go.
        We got you some --
 4
             MR. MASTAN: Wow.
5
             THE COURT: I didn't realize we had some water,
6
   but okay. You're way ahead of me.
7
              MR. MASTAN: What a great staff.
8
              THE COURT: Well, they keep me going here.
9
              MR. MASTAN: Thank you so much.
10
              THE COURT: You notice by the electronics here,
   the screen and all, we are now -- I prefer live for obvious
11
12
   reasons.
13
             MR. MASTAN: Yeah.
14
              THE COURT: But some hearings we're going to do
   still on Zoom and they had this -- you see this great
15
   screen in here. The staff has been -- and clerk's office,
16
17
   you know, fantastic kind of getting me into the 21st
18
   Century.
              So tell me how -- okay, so that was between --
19
20
   again, the oral between the firm -- the law firm and
21
   Mr. Richards' firm and that was to do what?
22
             MR. MASTAN: It was a referral fee as it was
23
   outlined in the complaint.
24
             THE COURT: All right. Referral fee for what
25
   case?
```

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Page
                                                            15
             MR. MASTAN: TXI. What is it? Oh. Oh, I
1
2
   understand that.
3
             THE COURT: Oh, I want to make sure the con --
4
   you're talking about the conflict.
5
             MR. MASTAN: No, he -- right.
6
             MR. RICHARDS: I'm not a party to the oral
7
   agreement, Your Honor.
             MR. MASTAN: I believe --
8
9
             THE COURT: Who's a party to the oral agreement?
             MR. MASTAN: It's the Finn/Sheldon law firm
10
   represented by Mister -- now represented by Mr. Richards.
11
12
             MR. RICHARDS: And two other lawyers.
13
             MR. MASTAN: Right.
14
             THE COURT: Okay. Well, anyway. One at a time.
             MR. MASTAN: It's the Finn/Sheldon law firm.
15
16
             THE COURT: Okay.
17
             MR. MASTAN: Enters into an oral agreement
18
   with --
19
             THE COURT: Okay. And that has --
20
             MR. MASTAN: -- TX.
21
             THE COURT: -- and that's one of these many other
22
   cases. It's a referral fee for --
23
             MR. MASTAN: Yeah, I think it's called the TXI
24
   cases or --
25
             THE COURT: Whatever.
```

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Page
                                                             16
              MR. MASTAN: -- something like that. Whatever it
 1
 2
    is.
 3
              THE COURT: Well, that's another case.
             MR. MASTAN: Yeah, it doesn't matter.
 4
 5
             THE COURT: And has that -- is that settled?
 6
   that money already been transferred in?
 7
             MR. MASTAN: Allegedly the money was transferred
 8
    into Girardi & Keese, one of the allegations in the
 9
    complaint.
10
              THE COURT: Okay.
             MR. MASTAN: And then according to the
11
12
   allegations of the complaint --
13
             THE COURT: Is that --
14
             MR. MASTAN: -- was then transferred out, at
15
   least in part allegedly to --
16
              THE COURT: I got it.
17
             MR. MASTAN: -- Ms. Girar -- to Erika, right.
18
   And that's with the --
             THE COURT: To her and/or to Mr. Girardi or both
19
20
    or --
21
             MR. MASTAN: To Mister who?
22
             THE COURT: Mr. Girardi or --
23
             MR. MASTAN: Oh, they don't specify in the
24
    complaint. They say it went to them.
25
              THE COURT: In any case, right, right, right.
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Page
                                                             17
1
   No, I was just --
 2
              MR. MASTAN: At least -- yeah.
 3
              THE COURT: -- tracing. I got it.
 4
             MR. MASTAN: Right.
5
             THE COURT: So the money was come in, they didn't
6
   get whatever -- assuming for argument's sake there's a
7
   valid agreement, whatever. There's agreement. And then
8
   the money went out and then everybody -- any money that
9
   went out from the firm to either of the Girardis are going
10
   to go after that. That's generally what's going on.
11
             MR. MASTAN: In general, yes.
             THE COURT: Yeah, okay.
12
              MR. MASTAN: But at the same time going back,
13
14
   Mr. Richards on behalf of Finn/Sheldon are going after
   those same funds.
15
16
              THE COURT: Right. Okay.
17
             MR. MASTAN: At the same time.
              THE COURT: All right.
18
19
             MR. MASTAN: And you can't be successful at both.
20
   And so if we look at the language --
21
              THE COURT: Of course, wouldn't the stay prevent
22
   the --
23
             MR. MASTAN: -- that was actually --
24
             THE COURT: At least as far as Mr. Girardi going
25
   after -- those are -- under 548 -- we're talking about 548,
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Page
                                                            18
   I assume, or something like that. Maybe not 548, but
1
2
   wouldn't those be stayed, those actions? Wouldn't the
   Trustee be the one to go after those?
3
 4
             MR. MASTAN: Not necessarily. Fraudulent
5
   transfer, yes.
6
             THE COURT: Okay. Fraudulent transfer, but --
7
             MR. MASTAN: Yeah, that's been taken care of.
8
             THE COURT: But even if -- but for -- but if it's
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   now alleged to be the possession of one or both of them, I
10
   understand obviously the tracing problem. Wouldn't that
   also be -- wouldn't the federal trump that? Wouldn't that
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   be -- that would be -- because it's allegedly -- if it's in
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   their possession allegedly wouldn't that be property of the
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14
   estate?
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             MR. MASTAN: No.
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             THE COURT: Why not?
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             MR. MASTAN: Not necessarily. Because if all
   they have is bare legal title, then there's nothing that
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   they can -- then there's no fraudulent transfer to recover
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   and we see that all the time in the context of --
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             THE COURT: Don't you --
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             MR. MASTAN: -- over --
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             THE COURT: Don't you have to get to the end
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   of -- the end of -- to know what the answer is to that?
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             MR. MASTAN: Well, but then who's getting to the
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Page 19 end? Which one of them? They're both moving forward with 1 2 the Finn/Sheldon defendants saying, hey, that's my money 3 that was converted --THE COURT: Yeah, but wouldn't they have then a 4 5 claim against the estate? Let's say the estate goes after 6 it and it comes in. Wouldn't -- and money is not going anywhere. Once it comes in here it needs a court order 8 wouldn't they then have a claim and at that point say, no, 9 no, no, that's really our money? I mean, isn't that how it 10 could work? MR. MASTAN: No, because if the Finn/Sheldon 11 12 creditors are correct that their money was converted by 13 Ms. Girardi --14 THE COURT: Yeah. MR. MASTAN: -- then the estate can't recover it. 15 THE COURT: Well, that's a bit of a -- but what 16 17 I'm thinking --18 MR. MASTAN: It's not property of the estate. 19 THE COURT: -- ahead. 20 MR. MASTAN: Right. THE COURT: That's a big "if." There's all kinds 21 22 of things. Let's say the estate goes ahead with that. 23 MR. MASTAN: Um-hum. 24 THE COURT: And then the money is there and then 25 wouldn't they still have the claim and say -- to say, no,

20 Page that was really -- we can trace it, whatever. Isn't 1 2 that -- couldn't it work out that way? MR. MASTAN: I don't think it does because that 3 money is going to have to be shifted to recover to recover 4 5 because it's a fraudulent transfer. Then it was Girardi & Keese' money that was transferred and that's going to be 6 7 shared with everybody on a pro rata basis. 8 If it was only if it was Finn/Sheldon money that 9 was converted by Ms. Girardi does it not be property of the 10 estate and they would get --THE COURT: No, no, I understand. But --11 12 MR. MASTAN: -- (indiscernible). Yeah. THE COURT: -- the way I look at it, sure have to 13 14 get to the end. You've got to know all the facts to figure 15 out. And also is it possible -- again, I -- this is asking 16 questions. 17 MR. MASTAN: Yeah. THE COURT: I -- as a former trial lawyer I know 18 19 the questions. I just don't know the answer. Is -- can 20 they actually -- monies come in and it goes in the gen -as I understand it from other litigation here it just went 21 22 into the general fund. It didn't go in -- it should have 23 gone in obviously to a separate account. 24 MR. MASTAN: I don't know where the money went. 25 THE COURT: But apparently that's not -- from --

Page 21 again, everything that I know about the case. That's the 1 2 problem; if it went into a specific account there'd be no tracing problem whatever. But apparently my 3 4 understanding -- just in general, not this case. I mean, 5 not this litigation you're talking about. It went in and 6 it went to the bank account and then monies went out. It'd be pretty hard to trace that, wouldn't it? I'm just asking 7 8 you. 9 MR. MASTAN: You know, I don't know what the 10 tracing situation is. I haven't seen the GK bank records. 11 I think they are -- you know, some of the records I 12 understand from Ms. Miller's representations and 13 descriptions pretty messed up --14 THE COURT: Well, that's what I --15 MR. MASTAN: Yeah. 16 THE COURT: And again, all my information, all I 17 get is --18 MR. MASTAN: Right. 19 THE COURT: -- from what's happening in court 20 here. 21 MR. MASTAN: But again, unless they can show that 22 that was GK's money that went to -- the issue is, whose 23 money went out. They both can't win and they're both 24 represented by Mr. Richards. 25 THE COURT: Well, not necessarily. GK, for

Page 22

instance, that debtor could if it's an improper transfer to either of them can get it back. But even then, that would be subject to -- wouldn't it be subject to somebody else saying, yeah, it originally was GK, but actually we can

MR. MASTAN: And, in fact, the answer to that is no. And that is because if it was -- if it's purely traceable by the Sheldon/Finn law firms, then it is not a transfer of GK's interest of funds.

THE COURT: Well, again, my question is, how do you know that until you -- and my question -- I get it.

MR. MASTAN: Um-hum.

trace it.

THE COURT: But in order to get the answer to what you said, you literally have to -- you have to litigate the whole thing and figure out all of it. And then when you're all done, then you can look back, but I don't see how you would know at the beginning of the lawsuit who's right.

MR. MASTAN: So let me answer that with a question. Who's going to bring that lawsuit? Who's going to make those determinations? Mr. Richards on behalf of his cli -- his purported creditor clients or Mr. Richards on behalf of the Trustee as its --

THE COURT: But aren't they going -- let me ask you this. But I get it.

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              MR. MASTAN: Yeah, okay.
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              THE COURT: Who goes first. But it seems to me
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   that -- again, I'm not -- I'm trying to explore because you
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   know much more --
             MR. RICHARDS: Yeah.
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              THE COURT: -- about this than I do. That's why
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   I like it more in person, so we --
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             MR. MASTAN: Sure.
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              THE COURT: -- we can ask is, there's really two
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   separate things. Let's say that -- let's say for whatever
   reason Girardi Keese said, you know, it shouldn't -- for
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12
   whatever reason it shouldn't have gone to you. Wouldn't
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   necessarily have to decide what right anybody else had to
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   them, would it?
             MR. MASTAN: No, that's incorrect.
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             THE COURT: Okay.
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              MR. MASTAN: In order for the Girardi and Keese
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   trustee to recover a fraudulent transfer part of the
   statute is there must be a transfer of the debtor's
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   interest in property.
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              THE COURT: Right.
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             MR. MASTAN: And what is clear from case law is
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   if you have bare legal title that is not a transfer of the
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   debtor's --
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             THE COURT: Oh, I get it.
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             MR. MASTAN: -- interest in property.
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             THE COURT: I get it.
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             MR. MASTAN: So if this money belongs to the
   Finn/Sheldon defend -- lit -- law firms --
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             THE COURT: Okay.
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             MR. MASTAN: -- then -- and --
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             THE COURT: No, I agree. I agree with your --
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             MR. MASTAN: -- then the Trustee can't do it.
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             THE COURT: -- what -- the laws.
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             MR. MASTAN: Okay.
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             THE COURT: Why don't you move on because we're
   never going to decide this, but I want at least in my own
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   mind get an idea of --
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             MR. MASTAN: Right.
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             THE COURT: -- what we're talking about.
             MR. MASTAN: And my point is, you don't need to
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   know the answer to that question now. All you need to know
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   how is that Mr. Richards is on both sides.
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             THE COURT: I got it.
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             MR. MASTAN: And it's a question of who gets
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   there first.
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             THE COURT: Okay.
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             MR. MASTAN: I do want to address briefly --
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   there was some discussion in the reply brief about five --
25
   sorry, 327(e) and its applicability.
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Page 25

THE COURT: Right.

MR. MASTAN: If you read the statute, 327(a) talks about being disinterested and not having a conflict. And 327(c) says you don't have a conflict solely -- solely by representation of a trustee.

THE COURT: No, I understand.

MR. MASTAN: Okay. Now, 327(e) read through on its face relates to the debtors. Now, there's a case out there from -- called *Polaroid* that was cited in the Trustee's reply brief. The *Polaroid* case talks about, you know, well, we have to analyze it also in the 320 -- in the con -- the conflict under 327 and some additional language that exists in that case -- or in 327(e). But my point is, the *Polaroid* case is a debtor case. That's why it's being analyzed under 327(e). It's not a representation of the creditors' situation.

So what we have, Your Honor, are two conflicts of interest. One is between Mr. Richards representing both the Shinn Fel -- Finn/Sheldon law firm.

THE COURT: Easy for you to say.

MR. MASTAN: Right. As well as the Trustee seeking to recover the same money. And as you -- your thoughtful question was, well, we don't know the answer and my point is you don't need to know the answer. There's an irreconcilable conflict of interest at that point because

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he is on both sides. And because at one point must decide he has to argue that it was Finn/Sheldon money that went to Ms. Girardi. On the other side he has to argue that it was Girardi & Keese money that went to Girardi.

THE COURT: All right. Okay. Now I do understand that.

MR. MASTAN: Okay. And that's the important -that's the single most important part of this. That's what we need to understand. If you've got that, we're good.

THE COURT: Okay. Now I do understand.

MR. MASTAN: Okay.

THE COURT: And I appreciate it. All right.

So what do you have to say? We now know what the issue is. I mean, I know what the issue was. We know at least -- now I know more about the actual lawsuit and so forth, so what about that?

> MS. WANG EKVALL: So under 327(c), Your Honor --THE COURT: Well, let me ask you specifically.

It sounds like he has a good point. Is he correct that that's what they're -- they -- there -- is it that they are seeking -- Mr. Richards' client is seeking that, no, this is not property of the estate. Any transfers that were -that the -- that you would be interested in, that is, from the -- representing the Trustee that that's -- now that's commingled or whatever the argument is and that's our money

Page 27 and if they have a claim then they have to file a claim or 1 2 if -- is he going to be arguing that, no, no, it's not property of the estate because we had this agreement. What 3 4 factually is wrong with that argument? 5 MS. WANG EKVALL: Well --6 THE COURT: Now, answer that specific -- because 7 I understand what the law is. That seems to be a pretty 8 good argument unless I'm missing something. 9 MS. WANG EKVALL: So under (c) there has to be an 10 actual conflict --11 THE COURT: No, no --12 MS. WANG EKVALL: -- and the fact that we're all 13 discussing these --14 THE COURT: Well, wait. Let me stop you. 15 why I'm pretty good at getting right to the heart of it. That's the issue. Is if -- and again, I have no idea 16 17 whether this oral contract is good -- forget -- I'm assuming just for argument's sake that's where we're at. 18 19 So I'm not deciding it, but -- so my question is, it would 20 seem that he has a very good point that it is Mr. Richards' 21 client is their position going to be or is it the position 22 no, this was not -- we had an agreement, this was never the 23 estate's money and, therefore, you owe it to us. Is that 24 their argument? Yes or no.

I mean, it can't be

MS. WANG EKVALL: No.

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because at the end of the day all it was, was a contractual 1 2 agreement. It wasn't their money. It wasn't that --

THE COURT: Well, I want to ask you -- no, no. 3

But whatever the law -- I want to ask you -- and I can ask 4

5 Mr. Richards here a very simple question that he raised.

Whatever you -- and again, I know what your position is. 6

I'm the only neutral person here at least arguing about this. It doesn't matter to me one way or the other. I just follow the law.

But my question is, he's -- counsel has just said that Mr. Richards is going to be arguing the -- that it is their money and not the estate's money, period. Whether he's right or wrong, that's not the point. It is his position that it is their money and that's the estate's and if that's the case, then it looks like there's a conflict.

So my question is, you can answer it or I can ask Mr. Richards.

MS. WANG EKVALL: I think there are lots of assumptions made there. If it's true --

THE COURT: No, but I get to ask the questions. That's what --

MS. WANG EKVALL: No, I understand, Your Honor. I'm trying to answer.

THE COURT: So it's a very simple question. his position that this money is not property of the estate

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   pursuant to this oral agreement, whatever. For whatever
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   reason, period. It's a simple question. Yes or no.
             Maybe I'll ask --
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             MS. WANG EKVALL: I don't know.
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             THE COURT: -- you, Mr. Richards.
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             MR. RICHARDS: Yes, Your Honor. The answer is
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   no. We saw in your order remanding the case we said all
   the transfers, if any, to Erika Girardi are property of the
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   estate. We agreed to this --
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             THE COURT: Well, then let me ask you. You heard
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   counsel just saying that your lawsuit is -- that -- is also
   going on and it was remanded to the state court, right?
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             MR. RICHARDS: And I didn't file the lawsuit just
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   so the Court --
             THE COURT: It doesn't matter who filed it. I
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   want to know -- you're counsel, right? You're in the firm.
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             MR. RICHARDS: I (indiscernible -- away from
   microphone) --
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             THE COURT: Right, right. So it's a very simple
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   question. Is it -- do you -- are you going to continue
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   with that lawsuit?
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             MR. RICHARDS: Yes, there's other defendants and
23
   there's other --
24
             THE COURT: Okay. No. Other -- as to
25
   Mrs. Girardi. That's who we're talking about here. Only
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Page 30 her. 1 2 MR. RICHARDS: The truthful answer is we have to 3 file an amended complaint, so that complaint that was 4 remanded it hasn't even been --5 THE COURT: No, I want you to tell me yes or no. 6 It's very simple depending on the --7 MR. RICHARDS: We're not pursuing any money that 8 would be property of the estate. 9 THE COURT: No, no. I want you to -- are you 10 going after her for any money that was distributed -you've heard what the argument is. Namely, money came in, 11 lots of money came in and then the Trustee -- what you're 12 going to be -- if you -- if I approve the hiring in this 13 14 case would be to go after money that was transferred from the debtor, that is, the Girardi Keese to Mrs. Girardi. 15 That's right and that's what you're being hired for, right? 16 17 MR. RICHARDS: We're not going after any of those funds. We already made a written agreement to that effect 18 19 with the Trustee. That's why they brought their opposition 20 to the motion to remand. 21 THE COURT: No, no. With -- no, again, again --22 but I know the Trustee wants to go after her, Mrs. Girardi, 23 for monies that were transferred from the firm to her. 24 that correct? That's what you're being hired for?

BENHYAT

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MR. RICHARDS: That is correct. To investigate

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Page 31 1 those. 2 THE COURT: To invest those -- those claims. 3 again, I have no opinion. I don't -- of any of this other 4 than that's what you're being hired to, to go after and see to what extent those could be recovered for the Girardi 5 6 Keese case, right? 7 MR. RICHARDS: That's correct. 8 THE COURT: Okay. So those are monies that --9 I'm repeating myself ad nauseam, but the money that came into the -- into Girardi Keese went out to her, to Mrs. 10 11 Girardi, right? 12 MR. RICHARDS: Well, we don't know. 13 THE COURT: Well, but that's what you're 14 investigating. 15 MR. RICHARDS: That's right and those are 16 fraudulent conveyances. THE COURT: Well, whatever. What I'm 17 talking about, just cutting through all the discussion --18 19 MR. RICHARDS: And we --20 THE COURT: And so you are -- when you're being hired to investigate whether any money from Girardi Keese 21 22 went to her and, if so, is there anything that the estate 23 can recover. 24 MR. RICHARDS: That's right. And a week ago I 25 was in front of you and we put on the record because the

Page 32 other lawyer asked me to do so for another co-defendant 1 2 that those funds belong to the estate. THE COURT: No, I understand that. I remember 3 4 that. 5 MR. RICHARDS: It's in your order remanding it --6 THE COURT: I --7 MR. RICHARDS: Bullet proof. 8 THE COURT: I get it, but I want -- but again, I 9 want to make it clear on the record because you are the one 10 who's going to be hired --11 MR. RICHARDS: Right. THE COURT: -- and counsel -- and so -- so we 12 know that you're going to be hired to go after money that 13 14 came out of Girardi Keese potentially to investigate to Mrs. Girardi and, if so, can that be recovered under any 15 16 theory. 17 MR. RICHARDS: Back to the estate. 18 THE COURT: Back to the estate. Back to what 19 your other -- the state court case. Are you going after 20 any money -- just her. Just Mrs. Girardi, not anybody 21 else -- that is, that same money, namely the money that 22 came from the estate whether or not --23 MR. RICHARDS: No, you're not because the only 24 money that came from the state could be a fraudulent

conveyance.

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Page 33 THE COURT: Right. No, no, but you -- her -- his 1 2 argument is saying that you might then claim this was never 3 the -- it was never Girardi Keese's money because you had a -- it was really your money. 4 5 MR. RICHARDS: That's not the deal we made with 6 the Trustee. We waived any claims of transfers to Ms. Girardi. 7 8 THE COURT: Okay. So you're saying on the record 9 that there's no conflict because you are not -- in this 10 lawsuit you're going to have to amend it and it will be a 11 part of any order --12 MR. RICHARDS: That's correct. 13 THE COURT: -- if I approve this that it will 14 make it clear that you've represented that indeed there's 15 no conflict as far as that because you are not -- and your lawsuit will be amended as to her -- you said there were 16 17 other parties involved -- that you will be not going after as to Mrs. Girardi any money that came from the estate 18 19 whether it was property of the estate or not. It came from 20 the estate. MR. RICHARDS: That's correct and that would have 21 22 eviscerated the good faith agreement we made --23 THE COURT: No, no. No, I --24 MR. RICHARDS: -- with the Trustee. 25 (indiscernible) oppose a remand.

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             THE COURT: No, no, I understand it. We were
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   here -- I don't know if you were here last time or not.
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   don't remember who was here. I was here, you were here.
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             MR. RICHARDS: Mr. Leer (phonetic) was the
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   attorney --
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             THE COURT: He -- yeah.
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             MR. RICHARDS: -- (indiscernible) and he put that
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   on the record --
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             THE COURT: Right. And so --
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             MR. RICHARDS: -- and in the order.
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             THE COURT: So it's clear to me that what you say
   then there is no conflict because you're not going to be
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   going after any of that -- any of that -- can't make any
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   claim at all to any of that money, right?
             MR. RICHARDS: That's where -- we couldn't.
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             THE COURT: Okay. I got it.
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             MR. RICHARDS: For all the reasons why we made
   the settlement with the Trustee not to oppose the remand.
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             THE COURT: Okay.
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             MR. RICHARDS: There'd be no -- that's not -- you
   don't make a deal and then say, we're really going after
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22
   it. It's in your court order. I mean --
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             THE COURT: I understand.
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             MR. RICHARDS: -- even though, Your Honor, the
25
   label is not dispositive, your order says transfer.
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              THE COURT: Okay.
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             MR. RICHARDS: And so I -- I'm not going to play
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   a game with the Court, but I'm telling the Court keep --
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   don't keep the case because we're not pursuing the
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   estate --
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             THE COURT: No, I understand.
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             MR. RICHARDS: -- and I still (indiscernible) --
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             THE COURT: That was the conversation we had last
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          Let me finish and then you wanted --
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             MR. RICHARDS: All right.
             THE COURT: Why don't you quickly respond because
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   Mr. Richards said it very clear on that point.
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             MR. MASTAN: What Mr. Richards just said was
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   they're not going after any estate money.
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             THE COURT: No, no.
             MR. MASTAN: That's what he said.
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             THE COURT: No, that isn't what I said or what he
18
   said. Any money that came from -- was transferred from
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   Girardi Keese to her. I didn't even get into whether it
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   was estate property at all.
             MR. MASTAN: Okay. But -- okay, that's why --
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   those are the words I thought he just said, but if your
23
   understanding is he's not going through any property that's
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   from Girardi & Keese out --
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             THE COURT: Right. To her.
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              MR. MASTAN: Okay.
                                  To her.
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              THE COURT: To her.
              MR. MASTAN: Here's the problem with that.
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              THE COURT: Briefly because you've already had
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   your argument.
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              MR. MASTAN: Real briefly. The briefly is that
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   they're continuing to pursue these claims under the state
 8
   law action.
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              THE COURT: He is not pursuing her for any money.
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   He said he's going to amend the complaint and I'll have
    that in any order approving his employment. They're not
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12
   going to go after any money that was transferred without
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   getting an asset -- any monies that were transferred from
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   Girardi Keese to Mrs. Girardi, period. There's no mention
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   in there whether there's assets to the estate or not. This
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    is money that was transferred from Girardi Keese to her,
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   period.
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              MR. MASTAN: Okay.
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              THE COURT: So why don't you have a seat? That's
20
    clear.
              MR. MASTAN: But that's -- okay. So let's assume
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    that they dismiss the lawsuit as to Ms. Girardi in state
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    court, which is difficult for me because I do --
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              THE COURT: Well, let me stop you.
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              MR. MASTAN: -- understand -- yes.
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Page 37 THE COURT: Counsel, why don't you have a seat? 1 2 I really -- I got to the point -- your point that you've He's answered it to my satisfaction. I'm not going 3 made. 4 to --5 MR. MASTAN: Okay. 6 THE COURT: -- have any further because you 7 had -- you made a very good point and I've -- and I thought 8 I knew the answer because of the previous hearing, but you 9 weren't here so I want to make sure that on the record in 10 this case it made it clear. I thought it was clear. It 11 really is clear. 12 So, counsel, why don't you come back? Maybe it was the other -- the previous argument as well as conflict. 13 14 MS. WANG EKVALL: The claims, Your Honor, as I 15 indicated earlier, Your Honor, as the Trustee's general bankruptcy counsel, my firm will be evaluating and 16 17 revealing and pursuing any objections to claims including claims of the law firm Finn/Sheldon if it's appropriate to 18 19 do so. We haven't gotten to that phase of the case yet. 20 We don't even have schedules filed and we don't have a claims bar date yet, but at some point --21 22 THE COURT: That's quite -- I think it was 23 sometime next year. 24 MS. WANG EKVALL: Some point down the road, Your

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Honor.

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THE COURT: Well, because it's so -- this is so complicated for everybody's sake, for claimant's sake, for every -- everybody's sake. That's why we put off the claims bar date to give you time to literally figure out what's going on in the case.

MS. WANG EKVALL: So we will -- there will be a point in time in this case when claims review and analysis will be necessary. And when that time comes it will be my firm that will be handling it, not Mr. Richards given the very limited scope of his employment.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

No, no. It's not going to -- nothing furth -that's why I prefer being in person. I can see about the -- no, I am satisfied that there is no -- there is no conflict and to the extent of any claim clearly that the Trustee will be involved.

And I appreciate again this one point. I thought I knew the answer and I want to make it absolutely clear that I thought I knew it, but I wanted Mr. Richards to state it because he was involved in the previous hearing on this remand. We made it quite clear because the issue did come up. So no and that -- what I would have you -- I will approve the -- I will approve the application, but I would like to have it in the order, this last point that we were talking about specifically that Mr. Richards made the

39 Page representation that essentially that -- that they're not 1 2 going to be suing any claim -- any of the funds that were transferred from -- they may have claimed later on the 3 4 estate, but as far as -- they're not -- in the state court 5 action that they're not -- they're going to amend the complaint and -- as far as at least Mrs. Girardi is 6 concerned, and they're not going to be going after her at 7 all for any transfers from Girardi Keese to -- to 8 Mrs. Girardi. 9 10 MR. MASTAN: May I ask you one clarification, Your Honor? 11 12 THE COURT: Yes. MR. MASTAN: To be clear, is that a release of 13 14 the claims that are asserted in the complaint? 15 THE COURT: No. Well --16 MR. MASTAN: So we can bring it back later? 17 That's the point --THE COURT: Well, the -- well --18 MR. MASTAN: That's the clarification. 19 20 THE COURT: I'm not going to worry about it. 21 That would be suicidal. They're not going to have to --22 this agreement they don't have to -- after they go through 23 here they're not going to -- I don't think they have to 24 waive anything. They're not -- the estate is -- that's 25 what he's being hired for. They're going to go after her.



Page 40

1 I'm not going to -- we could be here all -- forever --

2 hypothe -- I'm not going to ask them to waive any rights.

3 But as far as what they're -- the complaint will be

4 amended, it's not going to include any claim to specific

5 | funds from Girardi Keese to Mrs. Girardi. So that's clear

6 enough.

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What happens in the future, we could be here for -- we have bright minds in here. We could figure out all sorts of possibilities, but I am satisfied that -- first of all, I had no idea whether they will -- after the investigation the Trustee will pursue it at all. I have no idea, but I am -- so that's -- so anyway, so I am going to -- so thank you very much.

So just that one portion in there just to make it clear, it's not talking about assets of the estate. It will be transfers of funds because any transfer claim to any -- any litigation based on any claim of the Girardi Keese case based on transfer of funds from Girardi Keese to Mrs. Girardi and that -- they are not going to pursue in the state court, period. I'm not going to ask them to waive any -- who knows in the future, but that's -- but right now that's not going to happen.

And so if anything if they later do something, you can always come back and complain about it, but it seems pretty clear to me.

Page 41 MS. WANG EKVALL: I'll make sure to circulate the 1 2 order, Your Honor. 3 THE COURT: Okay. So let me ask. This is the 4 only thing. Do we have -- excuse me? 5 THE CLERK: (Indiscernible) 6 THE COURT: Yeah, in the future as you can see, 7 you can see where we care about everybody. We're pretty 8 careful here, but I -- it's so much different, the 9 different dynamic, as far as I am concerned, about 10 physically being here. You just can't compare. You do the best you can. I understand it's necessary, but we will 11 set -- we will still continue certain status conference. 12 13 few things on Zoom. But ultimately my desire is to get the 14 vast majority back in person like today. In fact, this 15 afternoon I have a big hearing again in person. 16 So thank you very much and I appreciate and I'm 17 glad -- my staff, they got you -- you can take whatever 18 water you were offered if you want, I guess. No one else 19 is going to use it, so take the bottle with you and I 20 will -- if you'll prepare that order I will --MS. WANG EKVALL: Thank you, Your Honor. On an 21 22 unrelated note within the same case if I may with the 23 Court's indulgence. 24 THE COURT: Sure, all right.

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MS. WANG EKVALL: We -- the estate has to move

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Page
                                                             43
   pictures on them that don't think they have --
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 2
              THE COURT: I say --
 3
              MS. WANG EKVALL: -- realizable value and --
 4
              THE COURT: He has many more, no doubt, than most
 5
   people, but --
 6
              MS. WANG EKVALL: Yes.
 7
              THE COURT: -- in any case I -- okay.
 8
              MS. WANG EKVALL: So if the --
 9
              THE COURT: Yeah, I'll --
10
              MS. WANG EKVALL: So just wanted to bring it to
    the Court's attention.
11
              THE COURT: -- take a look at it and I'm sure
12
13
   I'll sign it, so --
14
              MS. WANG EKVALL: Thank you, Your Honor.
15
              THE COURT: Okay. Thank you very much.
16
              MR. MASTAN: Thank you, Your Honor.
17
              THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
18
              MR. MASTAN: Ms. Fortier (phonetic), you are a
    lifesaver, thank you. Appreciate it.
19
20
              THE COURT:
                          Thank you. All right.
21
    (End at 10:41 a.m.)
22
23
24
25
```

Page I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter. Reth Ann Hager Date: 6/22/2021 RUTH ANN HAGER, C.E.T.\*\*D-641 

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Case 2:20-bk-21022-BR Doc 496 Filed 07/16/21 Entered 07/16/21 13:40:33 Desc Main Document Page 67 of 78

# EXHIBIT "2"

SMILEY WANG-EKVALL, LLP

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Tel 714 445-1000 • Fax 714 445-1002 13

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SMILEY WANG-EKVALL, LLP

3200 Park Center Drive, Suite 250 Costa Mesa, California 92626

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the Application were proper and that no further notice be given, and finding good cause for the relief requested in the Application,

IT IS ORDERED that, based on the representation by the Richards Firm<sup>1</sup> that the Plaintiffs in the Sheldon Litigation have agreed to and will not pursue any claims against Erika Girardi involving any transfers from the Debtor to Erika Girardi, the Trustee is authorized to employ the Law Offices of Ronald Richards & Associates, A.P.C., as her special litigation counsel on the terms and conditions set forth in the Application.

###

Approved as to Form:

**DINSMORE & SHOHL LLP** 

Signature attached PETER J. MASTAN

Attorneys for Erika Girardi

Date: June 10, 2021

Barry Russell

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United States Bankruptcy Judge

2870299.2

**ORDER** 

Capitalized terms shall have the same meaning and usage as in the Motion.

Casei 2:20-bk-21022-BR Doc 392 Filed 06/10/21 Entered 06/10/21 07:51:23 Desc Main Document Page 3 of 4 SMILEY WANG-EKVALL, LLP Lei Lei Wang Ekvall, State Bar No. 163047 lekvall@swelawfirm.com Philip E. Strok, State Bar No. 169296 3 pstrok@swelawfirm.com Timothy W. Evanston, State Bar No. 319342 tevanston@swelawfirm.com 3200 Park Center Drive, Suite 250 Costa Mesa, California 92626 Telephone: 714 445-1000 Facsimile: 714 445-1002 6 7 Attorneys for Elissa D. Miller, Chapter 7 Trustee 8 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 LOS ANGELES DIVISION 11 Case No. 2:20-bk-21022-BR In re SMILEY WANG-EKVALL, LLP 714 445-1002 12 Costa Mesa, California 92626 GIRARDI KEESE, Chapter 7 13 Debtor. ORDER GRANTING CHAPTER 7 Fax 14 TRUSTEE'S APPLICATION TO EMPLOY 714 445-1000 THE LAW OFFICES OF RONALD 15 RICHARDS & ASSOCIATES, A.P.C. AS SPECIAL LITIGATION COUNSEL 16 Date: June 8, 2021 Te 17 Time: 10:00 a.m. 1668 Ctrm.: 18 255 E. Temple Street Los Angeles, California 90012 19 20 21 On June 8, 2021, at 10:00 a.m., the above-captioned Court held a hearing on the Chapter 7 Trustee's Application to Employ the Law Offices of Ronald Richards & 23 Associates, A.P.C. as Special Litigation Counsel [Docket No. 318] (the "Application") filed 24 by Elissa D. Miller, in her capacity as Chapter 7 Trustee (the "Trustee") for the 25 bankruptcy estate of Girardi Keese. Appearances were as noted on the Court's record. 26 Having considered the Application and the pleadings, declarations, and exhibits 27 filed in support thereof and response thereto, and the statements and arguments of counsel on the record at the hearing on the Application, finding that notice and service of 2870362.1 1 **ORDER** 

2870362.1

**ORDER** 

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# EXHIBIT "3"

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Spertus, Landes & Umhofer, LLP 1990 SOUTH BUNDY DR., SUITE 705 LOS ANGELES. CA 90025 TELEPHONE 310-826-4700; FACSIMILE 310-826-4711

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The Court, having considered Plaintiffs Law Offices of Philip R. Sheldon, Philip R. Sheldon, Law Offices of Robert P. Finn, and Robert P. Finn's (collectively, "Plaintiffs") motion for an order remanding to state court the action entitled *Law Offices of Philip R*. *Sheldon, et al. v. Girardi, et al.*, Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. 20STCV47160 (the "Removed Action"), any opposition regarding the same, for the reasons stated on the record and for good cause appearing, hereby orders that Plaintiffs' Motion is GRANTED.

Counsel for Plaintiff also reaffirmed that Plaintiffs would not be proceeding on any fraudulent transfer claims, including but not limited to the 6<sup>th</sup> Cause of Action in the First Amended Complaint, and that fraudulent transfer claims belong to the bankruptcy estate of Girardi Keese.

The Removed Action is hereby REMANDED to the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Los Angeles forthwith.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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pate: May 13, 2021

United S

United States Bankruptcy Judge

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Barry Russell

	Case		Doc 31 Filed 05/13 Main Document	3/21 Entered 05/13/21 15:05:14 Desc	
Spertus, Landes & Umhofer, LLP 1990 South Bundy Dr., Suite 705 Los Angeles. CA 90025 Telephone 310-826-4700; Facsimile 310-826-4711	1	All parties hereby agre	er.		
	2	Dated: May 12, 2021		SMILEY WANG-EKVALL	
	3				
	4			/s Tim Evanston	
	5			Tim Evanston	
	6			Attorney for the Trustee	
	7				
	8 9	Dated: May 12, 2021		SPERTUS, LANDES & UMHOFER LLP	
	10			/s Ezra Landes	
	11				
	12			Ezra Landes Attorney for Plaintiffs	
	13				
	14 15	Dated: May 12, 2021		ROBIE & MATTHAI	
	16				
	17			/s Kyle Kveton	
	18			Kyle Kveton	
	19			Attorney for Defendant David Lira	
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	ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTON FOR REMAND				
	١			 EXHIBIT "3", PAGE 69	

### PROOF OF SERVICE OF DOCUMENT

I am over the age of 18 and not a party to this bankruptcy case or adversary proceeding. My business address is 3200 Park Center Drive, Suite 250, Costa Mesa, CA 92626.

A true and correct copy of the foregoing document entitled (specify): OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER GRANTING CHAPTER 7 TRUSTEE'S APPLICATION TO EMPLOY THE LAW OFFICES OF RONALD RICHARDS & ASSOCIATES, A.P.C. AS SPECIAL LITIGATION COUNSEL; DECLARATIONS OF ELISSA D. MILLER AND RONALD RICHARDS IN SUPPORT will be served or was served (a) on the judge in chambers in the form and manner required by LBR 5005-2(d); and (b) in the manner stated below:

1. TO BE SERVED BY THE COURT VIA NOTICE OF ELECTRONIC FILING (NEF): Pursuant to controlling General Orders and LBR, the foregoing document will be served by the court via NEF and hyperlink to the document. On (date) July 16, 2021 I checked the CM/ECF docket for this bankruptcy case or adversary proceeding and determined that the following persons are on the Electronic Mail Notice List to receive NEF transmission at the email addresses stated below:

☑ Service information continued on attached page.

### 2. SERVED BY UNITED STATES MAIL:

On (date) July 16, 2021, I served the following persons and/or entities at the last known addresses in this bankruptcy case or adversary proceeding by placing a true and correct copy thereof in a sealed envelope in the United States mail, first class, postage prepaid, and addressed as follows. Listing the judge here constitutes a declaration that mailing to the judge will be completed no later than 24 hours after the document is filed.

The Honorable Barry Russell

U.S. Bankruptcy Court Roybal Federal Building		
255 E. Temple Street, Suit	e 1660	
Los Angeles, CA 90012		
		☐ Service information continued on attached page.
		CSIMILE TRANSMISSION OR EMAIL (state method
following persons and/or e such service method), by f	acsimile transmission and/or email as fo	controlling LBR, on (date), I served the ail service, or (for those who consented in writing to llows. Listing the judge here constitutes a declaration appleted no later than 24 hours after the document is
		☐ Service information continued on attached page.
I declare under penalty of <sub>I</sub>	perjury under the laws of the United Stat	es that the foregoing is true and correct.
July 16, 2021	Gabriela Gomez-Cruz	/s/ Gabriela Gomez-Cruz
<b>D</b> (	Printed Name	Signature
Date		

### TO BE SERVED BY THE COURT VIA NOTICE OF ELECTRONIC FILING (NEF):

- Kyra E Andrassy kandrassy@swelawfirm.com, lgarrett@swelawfirm.com;gcruz@swelawfirm.com;jchung@swelawfirm.com
- Rafey Balabanian rbalabanian@edelson.com, docket@edelson.com
- Michelle Balady mb@bedfordlg.com, leo@bedfordlg.com
- Ori S Blumenfeld Ori@MarguliesFaithLaw.com, Helen@MarguliesFaithLaw.com;Angela@MarguliesFaithLaw.com;Vicky@MarguliesFaithLaw.com
- Evan C Borges eborges@ggtriallaw.com, cwinsten@ggtriallaw.com
- Richard D Buckley richard.buckley@arentfox.com
- Marie E Christiansen mchristiansen@vedderprice.com, ecfladocket@vedderprice.com,marie-christiansen-4166@ecf.pacerpro.com
- Jennifer Witherell Crastz jcrastz@hrhlaw.com
- Ashleigh A Danker Ashleigh.danker@dinsmore.com, SDCMLFiles@DINSMORE.COM;Katrice.ortiz@dinsmore.com
- Clifford S Davidson csdavidson@swlaw.com, jlanglois@swlaw.com;cliff-davidson-7586@ecf.pacerpro.com
- Lei Lei Wang Ekvall lekvall@swelawfirm.com, lgarrett@swelawfirm.com;gcruz@swelawfirm.com;jchung@swelawfirm.com
- Richard W Esterkin richard.esterkin@morganlewis.com
- Timothy W Evanston tevanston@swelawfirm.com, gcruz@swelawfirm.com;lgarrett@swelawfirm.com;jchung@swelawfirm.com
- Jeremy Faith Jeremy@MarguliesFaithlaw.com, Helen@MarguliesFaithlaw.com;Angela@MarguliesFaithlaw.com;Vicky@MarguliesFaithlaw.com
- James J Finsten , jimfinsten@hotmail.com
- Alan W Forsley alan.forsley@flpllp.com, awf@fkllawfirm.com,awf@fl-lawyers.net,addy.flores@flpllp.com
- Eric D Goldberg eric.goldberg@dlapiper.com, eric-goldberg-1103@ecf.pacerpro.com
- Andrew Goodman agoodman@andyglaw.com, Goodman.AndrewR102467@notify.bestcase.com
- Suzanne C Grandt suzanne.grandt@calbar.ca.gov, joan.randolph@calbar.ca.gov
- Steven T Gubner squbner@bg.law, ecf@bg.law
- Marshall J Hogan mhogan@swlaw.com, knestuk@swlaw.com
- Sheryl K Ith sith@cookseylaw.com, sith@ecf.courtdrive.com
- Razmig Izakelian razmigizakelian@guinnemanuel.com
- Lillian Jordan ENOTICES@DONLINRECANO.COM, RMAPA@DONLINRECANO.COM
- Lewis R Landau Lew@Landaunet.com
- Daniel A Lev dlev@sulmeyerlaw.com, ccaldwell@sulmeyerlaw.com;dlev@ecf.inforuptcy.com
- Elizabeth A Lombard elombard@zwickerpc.com, bknotices@zwickerpc.com
- Craig G Margulies Craig@MarguliesFaithlaw.com, Vicky@MarguliesFaithlaw.com;Helen@MarguliesFaithlaw.com;Angela@MarguliesFaithlaw.com
- Peter J Mastan peter.mastan@dinsmore.com, SDCMLFiles@dinsmore.com;Katrice.ortiz@dinsmore.com
- Edith R. Matthai ematthai@romalaw.com, lrobie@romalaw.com
- Kenneth Miller kmiller@pmcos.com, efilings@pmcos.com
- Elissa Miller (TR) CA71@ecfcbis.com,
  - MillerTrustee@Sulmeyerlaw.com;C124@ecfcbis.com;ccaldwell@sulmeyerlaw.com
- Eric A Mitnick MitnickLaw@aol.com, mitnicklaw@gmail.com
- Scott H Olson solson@vedderprice.com, scott-olson-
  - 2161@ecf.pacerpro.com,ecfsfdocket@vedderprice.com,nortega@vedderprice.com
- Carmela Pagay ctp@Inbyb.com
- Leonard Pena Ipena@penalaw.com, penasomaecf@gmail.com;penalr72746@notify.bestcase.com
- Michael J Quinn mquinn@vedderprice.com, ecfladocket@vedderprice.com,michael-quinn-2870@ecf.pacerpro.com
- David M Reeder david@reederlaw.com, secretary@reederlaw.com
- Ronald N Richards ron@ronaldrichards.com, morani@ronaldrichards.com
- Kevin C Ronk Kevin@portilloronk.com, Attorneys@portilloronk.com
- William F Savino wsavino@woodsoviatt.com, lherald@woodsoviatt.com

This form is mandatory. It has been approved for use by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California.

- Kenneth John Shaffer johnshaffer@quinnemanuel.com
- Richard M Steingard , awong@steingardlaw.com
- Philip E Strok pstrok@swelawfirm.com, gcruz@swelawfirm.com;1garrett@swelawfirm.com;jchung@swelawfirm.com
- Boris Treyzon bt@treyzon.com, sgonzales@actslaw.com
- United States Trustee (LA) ustpregion16.la.ecf@usdoj.gov
- Eric D Winston ericwinston@quinnemanuel.com
- Christopher K.S. Wong christopher.wong@arentfox.com, yvonne.li@arentfox.com
- Timothy J Yoo tjy@Inbyb.com